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Abstract. The recent crisis was characterized by massive illiquidity. This paper reviews what 
we know and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: market freezes, fire sales, 
contagion, and ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. It first explains why liquidity cannot 
easily be apprehended through a single statistic, and asks whether liquidity should be 
regulated given that a capital adequacy requirement is already in place. The paper then 
analyzes market breakdowns due to either adverse selection or shortages of financial muscle, 
and explains why such breakdowns are endogenous to balance sheet choices and to 
information acquisition. It then looks at what economics can contribute to the debate on 
systemic risk and its containment. 
Finally, the paper takes a macroeconomic perspective, discusses shortages of 
aggregate liquidity and analyses how market value accounting and capital adequacy should 
react to asset prices. It concludes with a topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts 
and recapitalizations, and analyses optimal combinations thereof; it stresses the need for 
macro-prudential policies.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The recent crisis, we all know, was characterized by massive illiquidity. Various 
markets (money, corporate debt, securitization, CDOs, etc.) ground to a halt. Investors ran on 
a variety of institutions, including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock before 
authorities guaranteed a substantial fraction of the financial system. Financial institutions and 
industrial companies scrambled for cash by selling assets at fire sale prices. Central banks 
injected unprecedented amounts of liquidity into the system. 
Much of the current thinking on regulatory reform focuses on how to avoid a repeat of 
this episode. Regulators strive to homogenize their measurement of liquidity and to improve 
their stress tests. The Financial Stability Forum3 (2009) calls for "a joint research program to 
measure funding and liquidity risk attached to maturity transformation, enabling the pricing of 
liquidity risk in the financial system"4 and recommends that "the BIS and IMF could make 
available to authorities information on leverage and maturity mismatches on a system-wide 
basis"5. Fair value accounting, once a darling of the financial community, has been at least 
temporarily relaxed, on the grounds that it creates excess supply of liquidity in booms, and  
(more relevant to the decision) shortages thereof when asset prices fall. 
But what is liquidity? Relatedly, why do firms and financial institutions fear 
illiquidity? Why can't they return to the capital market whenever they need to finance 
worthwhile (understand: "positive net present value") undertakings, be they new projects or 
the continuation of existing ones? What determines the overall amount of liquidity in the 
economy? What implications do economic analyses of liquidity have for financial regulation? 
This paper reviews what we know and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: 
market freezes, fire sales, contagion, and ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. Viewing 
liquidity as stores of value or real claims6, and building on the familiar notions of funding and 
market liquidity, Section 2 explains why liquidity cannot easily be apprehended through a 
single statistic. Section 3 reviews the determinants of corporate liquidity management and, 
given that prudential regulation traditionally has focused on the measurement of solvency, 
asks whether liquidity should be regulated when a capital adequacy requirement is already in 
place. After these preambles, Sections 4 through 7 form the core of the paper. Section 4 first 
analyzes market breakdowns due to adverse selection and why such breakdowns are 
endogenous to balance sheet choices and to information acquisition, and then  points at the 
role of financial muscle and limits to arbitrage. Section 5 looks at what economics can 
contribute to the debate on systemic risk and its containment. Section 6 takes a 
macroeconomic view and discusses shortages of aggregate liquidity; it then analyses how 
market value accounting and capital adequacy should react to asset prices. And it enunciates 
some principles for an optimal policy of public supply of liquidity. Section 7 focuses on a 
topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts and recapitalizations, and analyses 
optimal combinations thereof; it describes a rationale for macro-prudential policies. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
 
2.  Liquidity comes in many guises... or the elusive concept of liquidity 
 
For the sake of illustration consider a bank and its starkly simplified balance sheet 
                                                 
3 Now Financial Stability Board in its revamped version. 
4 Recommendation 3.2. 
5 Recommendation 3.3. 
6 Like most of the literature on liquidity, we abstract from nominal issues. 
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depicted in Figure 1, and suppose that this bank needs new cash in order to finance an 
expansion or an acquisition, or to withstand an unexpected loss in earnings or asset value. 
Alternatively, its wholesale depositors may have run away. 
 
2.1  Funding and market liquidity 
 
 
Figure 1: bank's simplified balance sheet 
 
To meet its liquidity shortfall, the bank may count on either funding or market 
liquidity.7 
 
Funding liquidity. Funding liquidity traditionally refers to the liability side of the balance 
sheet. The bank may issue new wholesale deposits, long-term bonds, preferred stocks, straight 
equity or still other securities. By so doing it dilutes its existing investors.  
     
          How much can be raised on the liability side depends on the economic environment; for 
example, improved corporate governance assuages investors' concern about the prospect of 
not recouping the money they invested; in economics jargon, better corporate governance 
increases the pledgeability of firm resources to investors. Thus, better corporate governance 
institutions facilitate refinancing by the corporate sector and thereby boost funding liquidity. 
 
            Another determinant of funding liquidity is the ease with which existing claims can be 
renegotiated. Funding liquidity involves diluting existing claimholders and therefore may 
require their consent. A large literature has discussed debt overhang, the idea that some 
claimholders, usually debtholders, attempt to free ride in a restructuring of the liability side. 
When the institution needs new cash to refinance itself, each claimholder would like others to 
make concessions (accept to be diluted, to bring in new cash) while keeping the full value of 
his claim for himself. The free riding issue has for example been prominently discussed in the 
context of sovereign debt restructuring. A unanimity rule clearly fosters free-riding while a 
qualified majority rule enhances funding liquidity8. 
Finally, funding liquidity may be pre-arranged, for reasons that we will shortly 
                                                 
7The role of these two forms of liquidity has been emphasized in particular by Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009). 
          The dichotomy between funding liquidity (liability side of the balance sheet) and market liquidity (asset 
side of the balance sheet) is primarily for convenience and is not as sharp as one would wish. Indeed, some cash 
infusions, such as the securitization of a loan portfolio with a contingent promise of liquidity support to the 
corresponding conduit, involve both sides of the balance sheet  (a conduit is an organizational structure that 
pools various loans into a single entity and issues securities (such as collateralized debt obligations or residential 
mortgage-backed securities) that are backed by the underlying assets). 
8 This is correct only in the short run. In the long run the ease with which debt claims can be renegotiated may 
deter investors from acquiring them. This is an instance of the trade-off between leverage and liquidity that we 
will later emphasize. 
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elucidate. The institution can secure a credit line or more generally some form of liquidity 
support from another institution.  
 
Market liquidity. To generate cash over and beyond the yield accruing from assets on its 
balance sheet, the bank can also sell easily-tradable assets such as T-bills, or alternatively use 
these as collateral in borrowing operations such as repos. Another strategy for banks to raise 
cash on the asset side is to securitize a portfolio of loans that it has issued. We will return to 
securitization later on. Assets like T-bills are usually said to be liquid in that they are traded in 
deep markets under limited asymmetries of information, and therefore sold with low haircuts 
or discounts. But so do stock market indices such as the S&P500. The distinguishing feature 
of T-bills, as we will later discuss, is that unlike stock indices, one can pretty much count on 
their delivering cash when cash is needed. 
 
That the liquidity of assets is driven not only by market micro-structure, but also by 
macroeconomic considerations is actually an old theme in economics. Borrowing from 
Marshall and Pigou, Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1967) emphasized liquidity preference for 
transaction and precautionary purposes (associated with foreseen and ill-foreseen needs, 
respectively), and made a distinction between running and reserve assets on the one hand, and 
speculative or investment assets on the other hand, where the latter are held for their yield. 
 
Funding and market liquidity tend to be correlated, as we have seen in the recent 
crisis. When potential buyers have difficulties raising funds and may even be in the process of 
downsizing, it becomes hard for sellers to part with their assets. Conversely, market illiquidity 
may make investors reluctant to bring funds to a bank that, they know, will have trouble 
selling assets. 
 
2.2 Other determinants of liquidity 
 
But liquidity depends on other factors as well: 
 
Risk management and financial structure. The flip side of liquidity management is risk 
management, namely the extent to which the bank's returns are insulated against shocks that 
are not under the control of the bank. This takes the form of interest rate, exchange rate, and 
credit default swaps, or other derivative contracts; such contracts can be viewed as pre-
arranged, contingent liquidity support arrangements. Thus, one cannot assess a bank's 
liquidity position without also considering its hedging policy.9 
  
  Relatedly, the bank can also make the occurrence of liquidity shortfalls less likely by 
issuing equity, long-term debt and preferred stocks (a form of debt which allows the 
institution to delay the payment of coupons as long as dividends on ordinary shares are not 
paid), or by including covenants allowing debt-equity swaps in certain circumstances;10 it 
                                                 
9 This observation of course does not imply that full hedging is desirable; indeed it may not be advisable to fully 
cover one's risks for a number of reasons: transaction costs, serially-correlated profits, CAPM-style arguments, 
asymmetric information, incentives, market power, and strategic considerations. For a review of these reasons, 
see Tirole (2006, p. 216-220); and see Léautier-Rochet (2009) for an analysis of hedging in oligopoly markets. 
10 In this spirit, the recent debate on regulatory reform has discussed the possibility of mandating issues of 
"Coco" (contingent convertible) bonds, which convert into equity if the bank's capital gets too low. The issuance 
of such bonds faces several problems, although the stigma usually associated with their introduction would be 
removed by the compulsory feature in the case of regulated banks. One of the worries about Coco bonds is the 
discretion involved in the definition of solvency. 
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thereby reduces calls for cash, especially in hard times.  
 
Reputation risk. Some institutions may be tempted (as Bear Stearns was a couple of months 
before its collapse) to rescue vehicles toward which they have no legal obligations. The 
private rationale for this is to attempt to restore a tarnished reputation by signaling strength, 
thereby “speculating on one’s franchise value”11. This risk unfortunately has not been properly 
accounted for, as the corresponding "obligations" do not carry any capital charge under 
current regulations.  
 
 One possible approach in this respect consists in trying to measure such implicit 
liabilities and in imposing a capital charge on them. Finding the right capital charges is likely 
to be complex. Given that the rationale for honoring such implicit obligations is signaling, and 
that signaling is often wasteful, I would rather suggest that regulators do not allow banks to 
honor (at least without penalty) obligations they have no legal obligation to honor. This 
prohibition would eliminate the supplemental reputation risk (the reputational damage done 
by a failing conduit is there anyway) associated with not honoring implicit commitments. And 
especially it would prevent banks from taking on contingent liabilities without allocating 
capital to them; put differently, the prohibition would eliminate a channel of regulatory 
evasion12. 
 
2.3  Measuring liquidity 
 
 These considerations explain why capturing the notion of an "illiquid balance sheet" in 
a single statistic is a difficult exercise. It is no wonder that prudential measurements of 
liquidity ratios are many, even though their approach usually consists in measuring some 
mismatch between short-term liabilities (making some assumptions on the fraction of those 
that could be called and therefore not rolled over) and liquid assets (again, building on 
hypotheses on market liquidity). Recently, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has added 
another liquidity requirement based on the “core funding ratio”, that forces banks to fund at 
least 75% of total lending through sticky liabilities such as retail deposits and wholesale 
borrowing maturing in more than a year13. More recently still, new Basel (III) regulations, 
besides raising solvency requirements, will impose two minimum liquidity ratios, a 30-day 
one and a longer-term “net stable funding ratio”. 
 
           A complementary approach reflects the idea that "you know it when you stress it"; that 
is, one can formulate some hypotheses as to the co-evolution of key variables and the 
operation of markets and look at the implications of various scenarii on the available cash for 
the bank. Such stress tests are only as good as the statistical data they are fed with (recall the 
wrongful use of  short and favorable time series in the assessments of risk prior to the crisis). 
But they nonetheless convey information about the liquidity of the balance sheet.14 
 
 
3.  Demand for liquidity 
 
                                                 
11 Duffie (2009). 
12 On this topic see the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision consultative document (2009), which offers to 
address reputation risk through pillar 2 of the Basel II accords. 
13 The Economist, September 5, 2009.  
14 The Basel club of regulators proposed in December 2009 to require banks to be able to withstand a 30-day 
freeze in credit markets. It also called for less reliance on short-term wholesale funding. 
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3.1  Basics 
 
3.1.1  The need for financial planning: transformation and maturity mismatches.  
 The raison d’être of corporate financial management is that revenues and outlays are 
not perfectly synchronized. The lack of synchronicity between cash flows and cash needs 
implies that  firms and financial institutions must find ways of covering their needs in periods 
of shortfall. Two broad strategies are available to this purpose: "finance as you go" and 
"liquidity hoarding". 
 
"Finance as you go" consists in returning to the capital market and borrowing from 
investors and other corporations when needs arise. Note that markets would satisfactorily 
bridge the temporal gaps between revenues and expenditures in a world of perfect (understand 
"agency-cost free") capital markets. 
 
"Finance as you go" however has its limits. Financial market imperfections, which 
encompass moral hazard, adverse selection (asymmetries of information about assets in place 
and projects), and mere transaction costs, make it hard for cash-strapped corporations to raise 
financing even for positive net-present-value actions. The subprime crisis is a case in point: 
the lending to the ECB rather than to cash-strapped banks by banks with excess liquidity, the 
stalling of the securitization and collateralised debt obligation (CDO) markets, the corporate 
credit spread, and the overall credit crunch despite the injection of liquidity by central banks 
all illustrate the difficulty of relying on markets for refinancing. 
 
For this reason, corporations must complement the recourse to the financial market by 
some planning of their own. That is, they must hoard liquidity either directly (by holding 
securities on their own books, or by taking on limited short-term debt so as not to be forced to 
pay back their entire short-term income to investors) or indirectly (by securing credit lines 
from  banks, insurance companies, or parent companies, which hold securities on their own 
balance sheets to back these lines of credit). 
 
3.1.2 A simple model 
Let us now develop a simple framework,15 which illustrates liquidity management and 
the concepts of funding and market liquidity and stresses the existence of a basic trade-off 
between scale and insurance: insurance is always costly, and reduces the investment equity 
multiplier.  
 
There are three periods: = 0,1,2t . Investors demand a (normalized) return equal to 1 
per unit invested between dates 0 and 2, and to R  between dates 1 and 2. 
 
 Illiquid assets. At date 0, a representative banking entrepreneur has wealth (equity) a  and 
invests i  in "illiquid assets". If resold at date 1, illiquid assets yield p  per unit. So a higher p  
means that the asset is less illiquid. One can think of p as technologically determined, that is 
as the value of the asset in an alternative use at date 1. Or else p might be market determined, 
like in the fire-sales literature discussed later. The parameter p therefore is a measure of 
market liquidity. Illiquid assets yield r  per unit at date 1. 
 
If brought to completion (i.e., to date 2), a unit of illiquid asset yields 1 , of which 
                                                 
15 This follows Farhi-Tirole (2009b), and is straight in the spirit of the model in Holmström-Tirole (1998). 
   
 7
only 0  is pledgeable to investors, where 0 1<  . That 1 0>   ("investors cannot grab the 
entire cake") is the essential difference of this framework with the Arrow-Debreu model. The 
wedge 1 0   can be motivated by private benefits of control, perks, verifiability problems or 
required incentive payments paid to the entrepreneur (or more generally the insiders) to curb 
moral hazard. The wedge could also represent money that is diverted toward other activities 
(affiliated companies, investment in human capital that will be operative in other, future 
activities). The pledgeable income parameter 0  is a measure of the quality of governance. 
We assume that 0>R  , since otherwise (and as we are going to observe) the bank would 
never have any refinancing problem. 
 
Liquidity shock. At date 1, with probability   the bank does not face a liquidity shock and 
can proceed to reap the benefits from investment at date 2. With probability 1  , the bank 
faces a liquidity shock at date 1 and must then reinvest 1 unit per unit of investment to be 
brought to completion at date 2. Let j , 0 j i  , denote the size of the continuation. The 
ratio ( )/i j i  measures the extent of downsizing in case of an adverse shock. 
 
Liquid assets. Finally, the banking entrepreneur can invest at date 0 in an asset that yields 1 
per unit at date 2 (and nothing at date 1). The date-0 price of this store of value is 1q   (it 
must exceed 1 since otherwise investors would increase their demand for it). Liquidity is 
costly if > 1q  (recall that consumers demand to recoup 1 at date 2 per unit invested at date 0). 
Let xi  denote the date-0 investment in this store of value. The number x  is akin to a liquidity 
ratio. We rule out for the moment liquidity pooling, that is we do not allow banking 
entrepreneurs to centralize their provision of liquidity and to redispatch it to those who end up 
needing it; this assumption is justified if the liquidity shortage events are correlated across 
banks. 
 
We assume for the moment that investors can monitor the bank's liquidity position and 
therefore condition their lending on it. 
 
Feasible continuations. 
 
In case of a liquidity shock, the bank can use:  
 • its hoarded liquidity, with value xi  at date 2  
 • its market liquidity, with value ( )p i j  at date 1  
 • its date-1 income, ri   
 • its funding liquidity, with value 0 j  at date 2.  
  
The last term deserves some explanation: the most that the bank can obtain by diluting 
its existing investors, i.e., the total value of the securities it issues, is the pledgeable income. 
So feasible continuations must obey the liquidity condition:  
0 ( ) .                              (1)j xij p i j ri
R
      
 Note that low-interest rate conditions at date 1 (a low R ) favor continuation, and so 
expectations of low interest rates make liquidity hoarding less necessary. Similarly, and 
unless the bank refuses to sell assets, market liquidity (as measured by p ) makes it easier to 
refinance. 
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A liquidity need (i.e., a need for hoarding stores of value > 0x  if one wishes to fully 
withstand the liquidity shock) arises if 
 
0 < 1                                                         (2)r
R
   
i.e., if the net per unit cash demand 1 r  exceeds the funding liquidity, a condition that we 
will assume. 
 
Borrowing capability (solvency ratio).  
 
At date 0, the bank needs to borrow  
,i a qxi   
an amount that investors must recoup later on. In the absence of liquidity shock, there is no 
reason to downsize and the latter receive ( 0 )x i   at date 2 and ri  at date 1. 
In case of a liquidity shock, the bank either continues at scale j  given by (1):  
0
( )=                                           (3)
(1 )
x Rr Rp ij
R p 
 
   
 (at the optimum, the RHS of (3) will never exceed i , as hoarding liquidity is costly); or it 
resells all its assets at price p   this extreme outcome stems from the linearity of the model. 
Furthermore, and again from linearity, it can easily be shown that in this model it is optimal to 
hoard liquidity so as to continue at full scale ( =j i ) or not at all ( = 0j ).16 
 
To shorten the analysis, let us assume that = 0r  (the asset's return is fully backloaded) 
and = 0p  (the asset is completely illiquid). 
 
Then, if the bank decides to hoard liquidity so that =j i  even in case of a shock, from 
(2) 
0= .x R   
Its borrowing capacity is then given by  
0
0
= ( )         =  ,              (4)
1 ( )
ai a qxi x i i
q R R
           
  
 and the banking entrepreneur's utility is  
1 0= ( ) .U i   
 
If the bank chooses to be illiquid ( = 0x  and therefore = 0j  in case of a shock, and 
0>R  ), the new investment I  is given by  
0
0
=        = > .
1
aI a I I i     
There is therefore a trade-off between liquidity(capital insurance) and scale. 
 
Hoarding liquidity is really about buying costly insurance from investors. It is optimal 
if and only if 
                                                 
16Partial downsizing arises naturally when one considers a continuum of shocks. 
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1 0 1 0
2
0
( ) ( ) ,
                        
(1 ) ( 1)(1 ) (1 )( ).                               (5)
i I
or
q R q
    
  
  
      
 
 
Obviously hoarding liquidity is optimal if it is cheap ( q  close to 1) and shocks are not 
unlikely (  is not close to 1). Liquidity hoarding is also more attractive when the pledgeable 
income ( 0 ) is high: hoarded liquidity is then easily complemented by funding liquidity. 
 
 
3.2  Discussion 
 
3.2.1  Asset-Liability Management 
 
Liquidity management must respond to the lack of coincidence between cash flows and 
needs across states of nature and across time: as we already discussed, risk management aims 
at partially insuring the firm's liquidity position against insurable risks. Similarly, asset-
liability management (ALM) techniques try to restore some coincidence between the timing of 
receipts and expenditures; thus, pension funds or life-insurance companies have higher 
demands for securities delivering coupons 15 or 25 years ahead than banks do. Again, these 
standard functions of financial officers would be hard to rationalize in a classical economics 
world,17 in which firms could costlessly return to the capital market to raise funds when they 
need to. 
 
While banks have always transformed short-term borrowing into long-term loans, an 
important pre-crisis development has been the financial sector's dramatic increase in 
transformation. Commercial banks, investment banks and a number of other economically or 
politically influential economic agents made themselves heavily exposed to refinancing in the 
wholesale market and thereby to variations in interest rates. We will return to this 
phenomenon in detail in Section 7. 
 
Increased maturity transformation is only very indirectly captured in the Basel I 
(1988) capital adequacy rules. The accord in appearance focused entirely on solvency. Yet it 
touched on liquidity issues through the concepts of tier 1 (equity) and tier 2 (debt over 5 year 
maturity, certain hybrid instruments). As we noted, medium- and long-term debt do not drain 
cash the way short-term debt does; similarly, preferred equity provides the institution with 
flexibility in meeting its liquidity demands. In this sense, the capital adequacy requirements 
defined in 1988 mixed solvency and liquidity considerations. 
 
3.2.2  "Last taxi at the station"  
 
 The conceptual framework makes it clear that liquidity, which is necessarily 
expensive (otherwise all assets would be liquid assets and there would be no transformation), 
is meant to be used up in case of important need. Or, as Goodhart would put it, liquidity must 
be usable liquidity: 
  
                                                 
17 Unless markets are incomplete. 
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"The most salient metaphor and fable in prudential regulation is of the weary traveler 
who arrives at the railway station late at night, and, to his delight, sees a taxi there 
who could take him to his distant destination. He hails the taxi, but the taxi driver 
replies that he cannot take him, since local bylaws require that there must always be 
one taxi standing ready at the station. Required liquidity is not true, usable liquidity. 
Nor might I add, is required minimum capital fully usable capital from the point of 
view of a bank. Principles of liquidity management, (and in my view of capital 
adequacy also), ought to be applied in a much more discretionary manner, pillar 2 
rather than pillar 1."  
 Goodhart (2008)  
 
The discussion above however only half-responds to Goodhart's point. The dynamic 
management of liquidity must account for the fact that drawing down one's liquidity position 
leaves the institution exposed to a subsequent liquidity shock that could occur in the near 
future (and so, that would not leave the institution with enough time to replenish its reserves). 
 
Economic theory has not yet offered much guidance regarding the repeated-liquidity-
shock conundrum. Nonetheless, very interesting contributions by Biais et al. (2007, 2010) and 
by de Marzo-Fishman (2007 a,b) shed some light on Goodhart's puzzle18. Biais et al. for 
example show that liquidity is not meant to be fully depleted even though it is indeed reduced 
after an adverse shock. Discipline is ensured by downsizing when things go wrong, not by a 
complete exposure to liquidity risk. The spirit of proportionality (for compulsory reserves as 
well as for capital requirements) should therefore be interpreted as a commitment of 
supervisors to promptly scale down the activities of banks that do not comply with these 
regulations, unless shareholders are willing to recapitalize them. 
 
 
3.2.3  Does a leverage/solvency ratio suffice? 
 
Capital adequacy requirements, as we noted, have traditionally emphasized solvency, 
although their use of maturities in the definition of capital embodies some liquidity 
considerations beyond priority ones (there is a close relationship, but no equivalence between 
maturity and priority). An important regulatory issue is whether one should append a liquidity 
measure to the solvency one. Put differently, can one trust the institutions to properly manage 
their liquidity, once excess leverage has been controlled by the solvency requirement? 
 
The answer to this question is not as straightforward as one would expect. As we 
shortly demonstrate, theory tells us that, even in the absence of externalities among 
institutions (these externalities are considered in sections 4, 5 and 7), institutions left on their 
own may well under- or over-hoard liquidity, although I will later argue that the former is 
more likely in general, and especially so in the banking context. 
 
Underhoarding may result from a form of asset substitution, sacrificing insurance for 
size. The institution may dispose of its liquid assets in order to expand the scale of its illiquid 
investments. It thereby obtains less insurance, but it still receives some, due to the "soft-
budget-constraint" phenomenon: If the shock to be met is not too large, investors will be 
willing to bring in new funds and bail out the institution. The availability of funding liquidity 
for self-financing continuations can lead the bank to over-invest and under-insure. 
                                                 
18 See also Shin (2006). 
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Conversely, it may also be the case that the institution hoards large amounts of 
liquidity in order to make sure that it will be able to finance even mediocre re-investments in 
the future. This reverse form of asset substitution is linked to the anticipation of poor 
governance in the future, in which investors will let management finance wasteful 
continuations. 
 
To most regulators, and certainly to observers of the current crisis, this overhoarding 
of liquidity and associated excessive initial restraint in the investment in illiquid assets 
probably feels like a theoretical nicety and a rather remote possibility. Yet, it is related to 
Jensen's (1986) famous condemnation of free cash flows and his prediction of an eclipse of 
the modern corporation. Jensen's view was that firms often reinvest in wasteful activities if 
they have availble liquidity. He argued that firms should be loaded up with debt, especially 
short-term debt, whose coupons or principal's reimbursement would force them to disgorge its 
available cash and to return to the capital market and justify new investments in order to 
obtain new funds. Jensen thereby counted on abundant funding liquidity and assumed away 
liquidity problems.  
 
 Let us return to the basic model and investigate whether, when left unmonitored, the 
bank would want to underhoard liquidity when certain continuation is optimal, or to 
overhoard liquidity when liquidation in case of an adverse shock is optimal. 
 
 Temptation to underhoard? 
 Suppose that condition (5) obtains and so capital insurance is optimal. Let the banking 
entrepreneur deviate from the agreement and invest all his date-0 money into illiquid assets. 
The investment level is then:  
  = [1+q(R-0)]i. 
When the bank is intact, the investors cannot credibly punish the banking entrepreneur for this 
departure from their agreement, since they get 0  in case of continuation and 0 in case of 
closure. Thus, a form of soft budget constraint obtains. By contrast the bank is closed down 
when distressed. 
 
 The banking entrepreneur's expected net utility becomes: 
1 0
ˆ = ( ) .U      
 
 Underhoarding occurs if liquidity is left unmonitored if and only if  Uˆ U , or     > 
i. Thus underhoarding is a concern whenever  
0[1 ( )] > 1.                                       (7) q R    
Ceteris paribus, underhoarding is thus more likely, the lower the probability of a shock ( 
large), the more expansive the stores of value (q high), and the higher the cost of refinancing 
(R). Of course, to obtain a complete picture, we should not forget that underhoarding is 
possible only if hoarding liquidity is optimal in the first place, that is, i  I. Thus 
underhoarding also requires  > I, or  
0
0 0
1 ( ) 1>  ,
1 ( ) 1
q R
q R R

  
 
     
which can be shown to be equivalent to 
0
1< .                                                            (8)
q
  
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 To sum up, underhoarding may occur if (7) and (8) (which are not inconsistent) are 
satisfied. 
 
 Note the nature of the externality on investors: when economizing on liquidity to 
increase size, the banking entrepreneur deprives the investors of the value (R-0)i of the store 
of value when unneeded (i.e., when the bank is intact); on the other hand, the investors also 
make a large profit, due to the large size, when the bank is intact. In order for the banking 
entrepreneur to benefit from underhoarding, it must be the case that investors lose in net 
terms. This is not always the case, and indeed condition (7) is required to obtain 
underhoarding. 
 
 Temptation to overhoard? 
 Suppose that, to the contrary (5) is violated and so it is optimal not to have capital 
insurance. The banking entrepreneur, when deviating from the agreement and allocating some 
of the date-0 cash to stores of value, can invest at level k given by: 
0= ( ) .I k q R k   
 
 Let us assume that at date 1, (R-0)k is then some "free cash flow'' (à la Jensen) that 
the banking entrepreneur can use in case of distress (note that the investors have no incentive 
to let him do so, as they prefer to pay themselves  (R-0)k rather than re-invest this sum into a 
negative NPV project). 
 
 Overhoarding yields expected net utility 
1 0
ˆ = ( )U k   
and benefits the entrepreneur if and only if k > I, or 
01 > [1 ( )] ,                                      (9)q R    
that is if (7) is violated. 
 
 The nature of  the externality on investors can again be described in terms of size 
versus availability of the store of value: When the bank is intact, the claimholders obtain a 
lower profit due to a lower size, but can seize the hoarded liquidity (R-0)k, that they were not 
expected to be available. 
 
 As earlier, we must not forget that capital insurance was suboptimal in the first place, 
i.e., that I > i. Thus overhoarding may arise if and only if k>i, or  
0
0
1>  ,
1 ( )R q R

   
which is equivalent to 
0
1>                                                             (10)
q
  
Note that (10) holds when (8) is violated. The overhoarding analysis thus perfectly mirrors 
that of underhoarding! 
 
3.2.4  Other considerations 
 
To sum up, our discussion so far tells us only that the liquidity choices cannot be 
completely left to the bank, but, unless one is prepared to calibrate the theoretical analysis, it 
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does not indicate whether the surveillance of liquidity positions should take the form of a 
minimum-liquidity ratio, a maximum-liquidity ratio, or both. Yet, I feel that the focus ought 
to be mostly on the definition of a minimum liquidity requirement. First, overhoarding 
requires poor corporate governance, enabling management to make a discretionary use of the 
free cash flow. While free cash flow problems do occur in practice, the case for 
underhoarding requires no such assumption. Second, and in the specific context of banking 
regulation, I venture into three possible extra reasons for focusing on minimal liquidity 
requirements, all related to the idea that low liquidity positions sacrifice insurance for scale 
and therefore represent an increase in risk:  
 
 Regulatory mandate. Banking regulators are particularly concerned about the debt part 
of the balance sheet, and in particular about the welfare of retail depositors or the 
deposit insurance fund. In this respect Mathias Dewatripont and I (1994) developed 
the "representation hypothesis", according to which a major objective of regulation is 
to make up for the inability (and suboptimality) of small depositors- insurees in 
insurance companies, future pensioners in pension funds- to monitor and exercise 
control over the institutions in which they invest their money. The banking regulator, 
according to this view, represents the interests of the retail depositors or, if the latter 
are insured, of the deposit insurance fund. This naturally gives regulators a rather 
conservative (risk-averse) slant, as they may not care much about the upside. Put 
differently, a lack of cushion is particularly hazardous for debtholders. 
 
Systemic risk. Potential domino effects of a banking failure have become very prominent 
lately, and have inspired a number of bailout decisions (for example, AIG's). Accordingly, 
there is an externality-based rationale for insisting on banks' holding enough liquidity so as 
not to expose the rest of the financial system to a widespread crisis. This argument is 
appealing but is not without its own limitations; for, one may wonder whether liquidity 
hoarding is the most efficient instrument to address systemic risk (we will discuss others), or 
even part of an optimal package of instruments to control that risk. We will return to domino 
effects in section 5. Section 4 will investigate another, “fire sales” externality created by 
illiquidity. 
 
 
 Macroprudential regulation. As we will discuss in section 7, authorities should protect 
themselves against widespread maturity mismatches. This offers a clear rationale for 
minimum liquidity requirements.  
 
 
4.  Market liquidity breakdowns 
 
Market liquidity presumes that there are buyers (of assets, of securities) on the other 
side. As the recent crisis has demonstrated, this need not be the case. Commentators have 
accordingly mentioned the possibility of a "buyers' strike", a surprising concept for 
economists used to the notion that prices will adjust downward to the level at which buyers 
will be willing to acquire the assets.    
 
For simplicity, we will couch much of the discussion in terms of the securitization 
market. It is clear that similar insights apply to the interbank market,19 which also froze 
                                                 
19 The interbank market has recently received much theoretical and empirical attention, see, e.g., Acharya-
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substantially during the recent crisis. Lending in interbank markets, like purchases in the 
securitization market, rests inter alia on trust about the quality of the borrower's/issuer's assets 
(remaining on the balance sheet, and securitized, respectively),20 and on the ability of 
prospective buyers to raise cash to finance purchases.   
 
This section considers three reasons why market liquidity may break down: adverse 
selection (doubts about the quality of the assets), insufficient financial muscle of prospective 
buyers, and regulatory arbitrage. 
 
4.1  Securitization freezes and stigmas 
 
4.1.1  Securitization: the fundamentals 
 
Securitization has recently, and understandably, come under attack. If it has been 
vastly abused, one should not forget that securitization is a useful institution for three reasons: 
first, it allows issuers to raise new cash and thereby undertake new projects. Securitization is 
then about the certification of the quality of past activities; asymmetric information about the 
real value of the return streams attached to the loans makes it difficult to offer the loan 
portfolio as collateral against further borrowing. The securitization process, if it is 
accompanied by careful scrutiny by buyers, rating agencies or credit enhancers, certifies the 
quality of the portfolio to the market and transforms otherwise illiquid assets into tradable 
ones.21 If properly performed (i.e. with the right incentives in place), this process thereby 
boosts the institution’s solvency position, a view reflected in the lower capital requirement for 
banks when the assets they securitize qualify as sales. 
 
Second, and in an economy in which stores of value are in high demand, securitization 
creates new stores of value;22 this effect is not to be neglected, as the demand for American 
stores of value stemming from China and other countries with underdevelopped financial 
markets or more generally a shortage of stores of value relative to their savings, increased the 
scarcity of stores of value in the United States and made it particularly profitable to issue new 
ones23. These two reasons (bank-level and macroeconomic level) fit well with de Soto 
(2003)'s view that a major role of a financial system is to transform "dead capital" into "live 
capital". Third, securitization may in some cases allow the institution to diversify its risk. 
 
Securitization of assets is fraught with asymmetric information hazards:  moral hazard  
to the extent that issuers have little incentive to create high-value instruments if they 
anticipate selling a major stake in them; and adverse selection whenever the issuer is able to 
cherry pick the loans to be put on the market. There is increasing evidence that asymmetric 
                                                                                                                                                        
Gromb- Yorulmazer (2009), Acharya-Merrouche (2009), and Heider et al (2009). 
20 But of course, the borrower's choice between selling an asset and issuing new securities hinges on a number of 
other considerations. For instance, keeping the assets on the balance sheet may facilitate the management of 
these assets by the borrower. It also gives a wider access to collateral to the lender (as in the case of covered 
bonds). But it is probably more information-intensive for the lender. 
21The securitization process is very similar to the exit mechanism in venture capital deals. This exit mechanism 
enables the venture capitalist to mobilize illiquid capital (part or all of his/her share in the venture), certify it 
through an initial public offering or a sale to a knowledgeable buyer, and thereby avail himself/herself of new 
funds to undertake new deals. 
22 These assets can also act as stores of value when remaining on the balance sheet of the bank and being funded 
by deposits. The reduction in capital requirements associated with securitization implies that stores of value are 
created  when the assets are transferred, though. 
23 See Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008). 
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information has played a key role in securitization of loans, e.g., Keys et al. (2008). 
 
Of course, these hazards are sharply reduced (and therefore the fraction to be 
securitized can increase) if monitoring occurs at the securitization stage. At least two monitors 
play a substantial role: 
 
 Rating agencies’ mandate is to assess the quality of the assets. We now understand too 
well that the rating agencies did not play that role successfully in the case of structured 
finance. Conflicts of interest, advice on how to structure portfolios (which created 
marginal AAA claims where the market was expecting average AAA tranches) and 
pre-rating assessments all conspired to mislead the market. The realization that rating 
agencies were not doing their job raised new doubts about forthcoming issuances, and 
contributed to the freeeze of the securitization market. Rating agencies are auxiliaries 
of regulation; their being part of the regulatory process, and the strong appetite for 
AAA-rated securities associated with the regulation of banks (since Basel II), 
insurance companies and pension funds, boosts their earnings. It is therefore logical 
that they be accountable to the prudential regulators if their ratings are used for 
regulatory purposes.24  
 
 Second, buyers themselves are meant to assess the quality of the claims. In an IPO 
(which is a form of securitization), this is achieved through the issuance of equity  an 
information-intensive claim  and by creating enough volume  for example through 
the institution of drag-along rights25  so as to attract interest in the issue. In the case 
of Mortgage Backed Securities in the recent crisis, buyers did not monitor very 
carefully the claims that they were acquiring. The reason for this is that they may have 
been more interested in acquiring highly-rated securities (which carry only small 
capital charges) than concerned about a low-probability, but large default.  
 
 
 This brings us to the regulation of securitization. The adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems mentioned above are well-understood, and we would expect markets to adapt 
to them and determine the optimal level of "skin in the game" that issuers must keep.26 When 
regulated institutions are involved as issuers or buyers, though, the regulator may need to 
monitor that depositors' or taxpayers' money not be jeopardized by an improper securitization 
process. In my view, the problem arises more when a regulated entity is on the buying side: 
when it is on selling side and provided that the sale is final (no possible recourse), then it is 
the buyer's responsibility to exercise due diligence and to demand a lower price if little skin in 
the game is maintained. By contrast, when the regulated institution is on the buying side, 
careless purchases may endanger its solvency, as the recent crisis demonstrated. 
 
What is the optimal level of skin in the game? On the theoretical front, a mechanism 
                                                 
24 One may be concerned that the same rating agencies (S&P, Moody's and Fitch) also rate sovereign debt, and 
thus cannot be regulated thoroughly by governments if the quality of sovereign debt may be called into question. 
In the absence of structural separation between corporate and sovereign debt ratings, the best safeguard against 
such collusion is probably regulatory independence vis-à-vis politicians. 
25 Drag-along rights allow for example a majority shareholder to force minority shareholders to sell their shares 
to a buyer (at the same price and conditions). They thereby facilitate the sale of 100 % of the rights to a buyer; or 
they increase volume an thereby raise investor interest in an IPO. 
26 An approach related to, but different from securitization is the issuance of covered bonds. The pool of assets 
serving as collateral for such a bond remains on the issuer's balance sheet; in case of default, the investors have 
recourse to both the pool and the issuer, who therefore keeps substantial skin in the game. 
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design analysis of optimal securitization illustrates the trade-off between the benefits of 
securitization  say, the transformation of illiquid claims into cash  and its cost  the 
reduction in accountability. The optimal retention rate is highly asset-dependent, making it 
hard to specify in a "one-size-fits-all" regulation a minimum amount to be kept by the issuer- 
in 2008 the European Union required its banks to keep at least 5% (as opposed to 15% in the 
initial proposal) of their securitized assets on their balance sheets. A claim on a reliable local 
government can be almost entirely resold without creating  moral hazard, while a claim on a 
highly risky borrower or project may be fraught with moral hazard and adverse selection. This 
makes it hard to design good, across the board regulations that preserve proper incentives for 
the issuer while safeguarding the benefits of securitization. 
 
 
4.1.2    Securitization breakdowns 
 
 The process of market breakdown was well explained by Akerlof (1970) four decades 
ago. In a market in which the quality of items for sale is known only to sellers, highest-quality 
sellers are the first to withdraw from the market when doubts about asset quality lead to a 
reduction in the market price. Their exit further lowers the price and triggers another exit 
wave by sellers with slightly lower quality assets, and so on. The market can quickly shift 
from an efficient, high-volume one to a transactionless market. 
 
Malherbe (2009) goes one step further and points out that market liquidity is affected 
not only by news about the overall quality of assets (for example the likelihood that subprime 
borrowers reimburse their loans, or the integrity of rating agencies), but also by the market's 
perceived motives for selling. His theory is based on the idea that liquidity-driven sales 
disguise information-driven ones: Suppose that banks' exact liquidity positions are not known 
by the market (presumably because of the difficulties involved in apprehending these liquidity 
positions and reviewed in section 2). If it expected that banks hoard substantial liquidity, then 
the market is subject to much adverse selection and breaks down: The motive for selling 
assets must be that they are of low quality, not that the banks really need cash. Liquidity 
hoarding is then self-fulfilling, as banks cannot count on securitization to raise cash and must 
hoard liquid assets. Conversely, a situation in which banks are expected to hoard little 
liquidity reduces the adverse selection (banks need to raise cash and are expected to also sell 
high-quality assets), and thus the prospect of a well-functioning securitization market 
dispenses banks from hoarding costly liquidity. 
 
A corollary of Malherbe's theory is that banks that want to part with some of their 
assets benefit from appearing fragile. This behavior resembles that of students' insisting in ads 
for selling their car that they are graduating and moving out of town (“moving sale”), or that 
of homeowners who go at great length to explain that they have exogenous reasons to sell 
their house. But how can this prediction that ceteris paribus a bank would like to convey the 
impression of illiquidity, be reconciled with the widespread observation that banks strive to 
avoid the stigma of looking fragile? For example, banks, whenever feasible, try to avoid 
borrowing at the discount window to avoid the associated stigma (in the same way that the 
IMF's contingent credit lines have never been used by countries by fear of being stigmatized). 
There is actually no contradiction between the two, due to the following suggestion:  
 
“Topsy-turvy principle”:  Appearing illiquid is a plus for a bank that looks for market 
liquidity, and a handicap for one that wants to tap funding liquidity. 
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The idea that banks which expect the securitization and interbank markets to freeze, 
will increase their hoarding of liquidity either as an insurance device (as in Malherbe's paper) 
or for predatory purposes (as in the literature on financial muscle discussed below) resonates 
with the recent crisis, which saw a huge amount of hoarding by financial institutions.27 
 
  4.1.3  Endogenous information about asset quality and market breakdown 
 
            An interesting point of Malherbe’s analysis is that adverse selection and market 
breakdowns are highly endogenous. In this respect, imperfect information about underlying 
liquidity positions is only one of several drivers of this endogeneity. Another driver is 
endogenous information acquisition about asset quality, the topic of recent contributions by 
Pagano-Volpin (2009) and by Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2009). 
 
It is often assumed that more information (increased transparency) reduces the 
competitive advantage that sophisticated investors have over unsophisticated ones. This 
reasoning is correct if what differentiates sophisticated investors is the ability to go and 
collect facts. It is flawed if sophistication refers to a higher ability to figure out what a given 
information actually means (Pagano-Volpin 2009). Thus if what is at stake is the differential 
ability to process information, more public information means higher asymmetries of 
information and therefore more concern for unsophisticated buyers. Consequently, the seller 
of securities may not want to disclose too much information in order to "reach" the 
unsophisticated buyers and obtain a higher price for the securities in the primary market (as 
Pagano and Volpin show, conclusions are different for the secondary market). 
 
To discuss Dang et al (2009)’s contribution, it is useful to start with some reminders 
about the impact of the information sensitivity of financial claims. It has long been 
understood (Hirshleifer 1971) that in a world in which parties cannot contract on trades before 
receiving information, the possibility of acquiring information jeopardizes the provision of 
otherwise desirable insurance. This idea plays an important role for example in the debates on 
genetic testing or mandatory health insurance coverage. That private information acquisition 
may impact transactions was developed in financial economics in celebrated contributions by 
Myers-Majluf (1984) and Gorton-Pennacchi (1990)28, which share the notion of "low-
information-intensity security". A low-information-intensity security is one for which the 
value of information about the quality of the underlying asset is small. The security is in a 
sense a "no-brainer".  
 
Myers and Majluf, and a sizeable subsequent literature on security design, have argued 
that issuers endowed with private information about the value of underlying assets will want 
to follow a pecking order in the type of securities they issue. Safe debt is an instrument of 
choice, as it does not give rise to adverse selection; with larger cash needs the issuer ought to 
go for more and more “information-intensive” securities, even though the corresponding 
markets are fraught with adverse selection: risky debt, hybrid securities, and, in the last resort, 
equity. The same idea explains why the collateral posted in repos has historically (although 
not lately, with assets such as CDOs being used as collateral prior to the crisis) been safe 
securities such as Treasury securities.  
 
                                                 
27 For example, Acharya-Merrouche (2009) document that after August 2007 liquidity buffers of UK banks 
increased by 30 %. Another illustration is the dramatic increase in parking at the ECB after September 2008 
(Heider et al 2009). 
28 See Chapters 6 and 12 in Tirole (2006) for a review of this literature. 
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Information intensity refers to the gain that a seller or buyer of this security can secure 
by acquiring costly information about its value; for example, there is no gain acquiring 
information about the value of a debt claim sufficiently covered by high-quality collateral, but 
there are substantial gains in acquiring information about the value of shares in an initial 
public offering29. While this concept is context dependent (it depends on the price of the 
security and therefore, inter alia, on whether other investors are acquiring information), it is a 
very useful tool to understand the working of financial markets.  
 
Analysing security design as well, but focusing on future rather than current adverse 
selection, Gorton and Pennacchi make the point that different clienteles may be interested in 
securities with different information intensities. Safe debt is very attractive to investors with 
short horizons (in the sense of a high probability of turnover), as they will not “lose their 
shirt” when they need to resell their securities30; by contrast, an investor holding shares in a 
corporation is likely to face better informed traders when he resells his stake and will on 
average lose money to them. This theory, which incidentally predicts an equity premium, also 
resonates with common wisdom, as main street bank employees usually recommend bonds to 
investors with short horizons and stocks for their retirement savings. 
 
Dang et al (2009) make a simple, but important observation: a security’s information 
intensity varies with news accruing about the quality of underlying asset or borrower. 
Consider for instance a debt claim. As long as the underlying assets pay off nicely or the 
borrower remains solvent, the ex post return on the debt claim is constant. So additional ex 
ante information about the quality of the underlying asset (or about the borrower’s solvency) 
is almost useless; that is, the return on a debt claim is relatively insensitive to additional 
information when (publicly known) prospects are favorable and so its reimbursement is pretty 
secure (the option is well into the money). By contrast, when doubts about the quality of 
assets or the borrower’s solvency are raised, it becomes profitable for potential sellers and 
buyers of the security to go and collect information about the real value. In a nutshell, the 
market for the security switches from a liquid, symmetric information market to an illiquid, 
low-volume one in which adverse selection and suspicions about the motives for trade are 
paramount.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Note that Myers and Majluf’s pecking order is reversed in an IPO, as information-intensive securities are 
issued so as to provide investors with incentives to acquire information about the value of assets in place and 
thereby enable exit by the venture capitalist and possibly the managerial team without impairing their initial 
incentives. On this see Aghion et al (2004).  
30 For the same reason, stock market indices are more attractive than individual stocks for short-horizon 
investors, as it is widely believed that there is less adverse selection on a large number of securities than on 
individual ones: see Gorton-Pennacchi (1993) and Subrahmanyam (1991). 
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Figure 2: Dang-Gorton-Holmström's double whammy argument 
 
Dang et al’s analysis, which is depicted in Figure 2, implies that institutions should be 
wary of market liquidity (the option to resell assets) as a means to cover their liquidity needs. 
Not only is it the case that bad news about the quality of assets may lower the resale price; but 
precisely in that event, the secondary market will be fraught with adverse selection and will 
dry up. This double whammy prediction fits well with the recent episode, in which the 
securitization market, the repo market and a number of other collaterized markets froze31.   
 
4.2  Local liquidity, financial muscle and fire sales 
 
          Common sense suggests that asset prices are likely to be low when lots of assets are for 
sale in the market. Standard (market micro-structure) theory explains this through the 
presence of adverse selection: a high volume of sell orders suggests that sellers/ speculators 
are pessimistic about prospects32. Thus, the demand curve for securities is not perfectly 
elastic. 
 
          This theory does not seem to account for fire sale episodes such as the one we just 
witnessed. Somehow, one feels that, beyond the adverse selection problem discussed in 
section 4.1, there is also a limit to arbitrage. Potential buyers don’t have enough financial 
muscle to acquire the assets. Or, to use a term coined by Bengt Holmström, “local liquidity” 
is limited.  
 
          Thus, a now sizeable literature has investigated institutions’ incentives to hoard 
liquidity for the purpose of acquiring assets in distress from other institutions in the future. A 
simple, but important point is that, if liquidity is costly, then assets must be expected to trade 
in the secondary market at a price below their fundamental value at the date of secondary 
trading; for, the wedge between fundamental value and price in the secondary market is what 
gives institutions ex-ante incentives to hoard liquidity. Otherwise, institutions would sacrifice 
return and would be better off investing only in illiquid assets and not hoarding liquidity.  
 
                                                 
31 It also responds to the possibility -- related to the previous discussion of Malherbe -- that asset markets should 
become more liquid when lots of institutions are in distress and so the motive for selling is unlikely to be adverse 
selection (Uhlig 2009). Uhlig proposes an alternative theory for why markets may freeze when bad news 
accrues; this theory is based on the assumption that investors are "uncertainty averse" -- they are only willing to 
pay the value corresponding to the lower bound of the support of possible distributions. 
32 This idea, due to Kyle (1985), does not conflict with Malherbe's theory (reviewed above). In the market-
microstructure story, sell-orders are large and prices are low when news about the asset is bad and unobservable. 
In Malherbe’s story, sell orders and price increase when public information accrues that potential sellers need 
cash. In either case, liquidity-driven sales disguise information-driven ones and sustain the price of the asset. 
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          An important early analysis of fire sales is due to Allen and Gale (e.g.,1994, 1998). 
Their analysis is couched in a Diamond-Dybvig (1983)-style model of consumer liquidity 
demand. Imagine that today investors separately invest in liquid (short-term) assets, that 
yields a safe return at the intermediate date, and higher-yield illiquid (long-term) assets. 
Tomorrow a fraction of consumers will want to consume; to this purpose, they will use the 
returns on the short-term assets and also will  resell their long-term assets. The focus of the 
1994 paper is on how much these long-term assets will fetch in the secondary market. There is 
aggregate uncertainty, in that the number of consumers who desire to consume early is 
random. The clearing condition in the secondary market for the long-term asset is that 
consumers who desire to consume late use the proceeds of their short-term assets to purchase 
the long-term assets unwanted by the consumers who desire to consume early. The former- 
the buyers- have limited cash on hand, and so the asset price decreases when more 
consumers- the sellers- want to dispose of their long-term assets in the market. This 
phenomenon is called “cash-in-the-market pricing” by Allen and Gale. 
 
          Allen and Gale later allow intermediaries to pool liquidity and to offer non-contingent 
deposit contracts. The lower the resale price, the more long-term assets the intermediary needs 
to sell in order to honour its commitment towards depositors. This, together with the 
intermediaries’ limited liability, adds a discontinuity in the resale price of the secondary asset. 
If the resale price is too low, the intermediary goes bankrupt and then its entire holdings of 
long-term assets are dumped on the market, creating a “crisis”. 
 
          The literature on financial muscle more generally emphasizes the role of contract 
incompleteness (the absence of ex ante pooling arrangements for sharing liquidity) and ex 
post secondary markets for assets. Caballero and Krishnamurthy have in a series of papers  
(for example 2003 a, b) emphasized the scope for under hoarding of liquidity in environments 
where intact institutions’ financial muscle exerts positive externalities on distressed 
institutions.  Similarly a number of recent papers on fire sales externalities have shown that 
pecuniary externalities matter when agents are liquidity constrained: Individual institutions do 
not internalize the fact that their maturity mismatch will depress the market price of assets in 
the secondary market in case of an adverse macroeconomic shock and thereby hamper the 
other institutions’ ability to refinance. 
 
          But liquidity may also be over hoarded for rent seeking purposes. In Holmström-Tirole 
(2009, Chapter 7), institutions hoard costly liquidity in order to overbid rivals in the market 
for distressed assets. A reinterpretation of such “vulture behaviors” has institutions with cash 
playing a waiting game and refusing to buy distressed assets at fire-sale prices in order to buy 
them at a still lower price in the future. This behavior may have taken place in the recent 
crisis, when cash-rich institutions accumulated reserves at the central banks rather than 
lending their extra cash to, or buying assets from distressed institutions33. 
 
 
4.3   Regulatory arbitrage 
 
 The notion of market breakdown hinges on the idea that some gains from trade are not 
realized. But what if there are actually no gains from trade between the two sides of the 
transaction? Diamond and Rajan’s "asset substitution theory" (2009), applying the theory of 
debt overhang and risk shifting, offers an alternative perspective for the recent freeze of some 
                                                 
33 It is hard, of course, to know whether this behavior was motivated by a waiting game or by the fear that they 
themselves might need cash in the near future. 
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markets. In a nutshell, a transfer of assets from distressed institutions to deep-pocket ones 
would enable the former to refinance and would benefit the society as a whole; it may 
however not be in the interest of the two protagonists in the transaction, the buyer and the 
seller. Diamond and Rajan's idea is that a third party not involved in the transaction, the 
taxpayer, would benefit from the trade, which would make the government’s stake in the 
distressed bank (for example, the deposit insurance fund’s stake) more secure. But the buyer 
and the seller do not internalize this gain. In the absence of bilateral gains from trade, the 
management of the distressed bank refuses to sell assets at a low price in the hope of good 
news. 
 
 To illustrate such "gambling for resurrection" in a rather stark way, suppose that the 
distressed bank owes a liability of 8 to depositors (or the deposit insurance fund). It owns an 
asset of nominal value 10.  However bad news accrues, that indicates that this asset will pay 
off 10 with probability 1/2 and 0 otherwise. Information is symmetric, and so buyers would 
be willing to buy at price p=5. But the intact bank is better off holding on to this asset in the 
hope that it recovers and enables it to make a profit of 10-8=2. Because the depositors' claim 
is a debt claim, the distressed bank prefers to keep its call option. This example of course is 
too simplistic; to make it more interesting one can add a benefit from the distressed bank's  
enjoying some liquidity, such as refinancing new projects. But as long as the distressed bank 
benefits substantially from hanging on to its call on asset recovery,  the asset market will 
remain inactive. 
 
 This example illustrates the more general point that regulatory arbitrage may interfere 
with markets. Another illustration is provided by the recent relaxation of accounting 
standards, enabling financial institutions to return to historical cost accounting under certain 
circumstances. When historical levels are allowed as measures of asset values, institutions are 
incentivized to sell winners (and then record them at their market value) and to keep losers so 
as to avoid recognizing losses34. This reluctance to sell losers can lead to a freeze of markets 
that would operate normallly in the absence of regulation. 
 
 
5 Economics of domino effects 
 
 An institution's liquidity and solvency may be jeopardized if the solvency of other 
institutions it has lent to  is compromised. This section reviews what we know and don't know 
about systemic risk. 
 
 
5.1  Centralized vs. decentralized trading 
 
 One of the major regulatory failures of this decade has been the lenient attitude of 
regulators toward OTC markets, or more precisely toward the involvement of strategic players 
(players whose stability is crucial to the economy) in these markets. For instance, AIG's 
holding company, an investment bank which was involved in $440 bn in protection contracts, 
was rescued by fear that a large-scale domino effect would result from bankruptcy. The 
traditional view of prudential regulation, the protection of depositors, has recently left center 
stage, and systemic risk has become by far authorities’ main concern. 
 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Dewatripont-Tirole (1994) for a discussion of gains trading. 
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 It is natural for financial institutions to lend to each other. Such lending may smooth 
liquidity positions; for example a bank or mutual fund may have incurred substantial 
withdrawals or redemptions while others have not and thereby hold excess liquidity. 
Similarly, risk management necessitates entering into interest rate and FX swap agreements, 
or CDS contracts.35 This pooling of risk and  handling of asynchronicities however gives rise 
to a new type of risk, the counterparty risk associated with cross exposures. Accordingly, 
mutual exposures raise concerns for the system’s financial stability. 
 
 There are two polar views on how cross exposures are to be handled. In a centralized 
approach, transactions between two parties involve a clearinghouse acting as a counterparty to 
the trade. In a decentralized approach, epitomized by the OTC markets, no one interferes with 
the cross-exposures and the two parties are free to take as much counterparty risk and/or 
require as little collateral requirement (i.e. low haircuts on the collateralized assets) as they 
like.  
 
 Hybrid systems combine centralization with cross exposures. For example, a large 
value intra-day payment system may be centralized, but let each participant set bilateral 
overdraft ceilings, which are akin to bilateral credit lines. The bilateral overdraft ceilings are 
then aggregated by the system to define an individualized overall cap on each member’s 
intraday overdraft. In case of default of a participant at the end of the day, a loss sharing 
formula has members share the losses of the failing bank proportionally to the overdrafts 
granted to the failing bank. See the analytical framework in Rochet-Tirole (1996b), which 
combines the properties of the privately held net-settlement system CHIPS36 and the Federal 
Reserve Banks’ gross-settlement system Fedwire.37  The latter is centralized and involves no 
cross exposures among participants, but allows overdrafts (priced and subject to a net debit 
cap) with respect to the Fed. The former by contrast allows its members to give each other 
intraday credit facilities. 
 
Conversely, in some extreme cases, decentralization may not imply cross exposures. 
The recent regime of government guarantees on interbank lending is a case in point. Under 
guaranteed interbank lending, a loan from bank A to bank B is de facto a loan from the 
government to bank B. This raises the question of why the government does not lend directly. 
 
Centralization should be encouraged, as the benefits of decentralization can be 
duplicated on centralized platforms and the latter have futher benefits: 
 
 Transparency. In a decentralized system, parties know their cross-exposures with their 
counterparties, but they have little clue about their counterparties’ exposures to third 
parties.  Although the fall 2008 disruption may have other causes, the Lehman 
Brothers episode is a case in point, which later led the US authorities to rescue some 
other key financial players by fear of propagation. By contrast, the collapse of the 
                                                 
35 Shin (2009) further argues that mutual exposures arise naturally in long chains of intermediation, such as 
mortgage pool – ABS issuer – securities firm – commercial bank – money market fund. 
36 Clearing House Interbank Payments System, a privately-held net settlement system. It has a smaller 
membership than Fedwire (only 47 very large institutions participate, while Fedwire has 9,289 members), and 
nets payments at the end of the day.  CHIPS opens at 9 AM. Between 9 AM and 5 PM, banks send payments to 
each other; they must maintain a positive net balance up to the credit limits that were arranged among banks 
before 9 AM. CHIPS requires banks to fund their negative closing positions by 5:15 PM; payment orders are 
then sent through Fedwire. 
37 Fedwire is a real-time gross settlement system. The payment of a transaction is processed at the time of the 
transfer (say 11 AM) rather than at the end of the day (say 5:30 PM). Payments are final and irrevocable. 
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large hedge fund Amaranth in 2006 had very little impact on financial markets, as the 
hedge fund was trading in well-organized (mainly energy) centralized markets38. 
Transparency is important also for the regulators, as interconnexions currently make it 
almost impossible to figure out what the real solvency of individual institutions is.  
To be certain, regulators could demand transparency of positions even in decentralized 
markets. However, the complexity posed to regulators by this solution is daunting. 
OTC products are often very complex objects whose covenants and implications 
thereof are understood by only a handful of experts. Furthermore, the chain of 
counterparty risks remains rather opaque. 
Centralization of trades through a central clearing counterparty of course is no 
panacea. Poorly monitored, a central clearing counterparty might take on substantial 
direct or indirect counterparty risk vis-à-vis the members. It might thereby become yet 
another “too-big-to-fail institution”. It is therefore important to apply careful 
prudential regulation to such parties. This brings me to a second desirable move. 
 Standardized products. There are substantial social benefits to the trading of financial 
products in liquid markets. The existence of market prices in particular allows the 
central clearing counterparty to be more accurate in the dynamic adjustment of its 
margin calls. And, crucially, it allows supervisors to better monitor the solvency of 
central clearing counterparties and therefore to reduce the likelihood of a bailout of 
such institutions. The standardization of products, which could be promoted through a 
sufficiently strong differentiation in capital charges for regulated entities,39 comes at a 
cost as regulated entities will find it more expensive to provide their customers with 
finely tailored (bespoke) products. But many useful derivative products (exchange and 
interest rate swaps, commodity insurance, credit default swaps, etc.) can be or already 
are standardized. The loss in granularity in my view is second order compared to the 
externality currently inflicted upon society by current arrangements. 
 Multilateral netting. Decentralized markets allow netting between two institutions. By 
contrast, centralized ones enable multilateral netting, thereby reducing collateral 
requirements. If A owes money to B, who owes money to C, who owes money to A, 
bilateral netting won’t save on collateral as each pair’s relationship invoves a large net 
exposure. Centralized systems are a priori superior to decentralized ones, as they can 
mimic the benefits of bilateral deals while not exhibiting their flaws. I have already 
mentioned the possibility of embodying transparent mutual overdraft (exposures) in a 
centralized system. Duffie and Zhu (2009) analyse potential costs of central clearing 
platforms. The first is the proliferation of platforms (for example there are currently 
two approved CDS central clearing counterparties in the US and five in Europe); 
unless these institutions are connected through cross-margining agreements,40 the 
resulting outcome may be very costly in collateral if cross-exposures are widespread 
and so players must be active on multiple platforms. Second, the desirability of netting 
also applies cross-products. One may net a CDS contract with an interest-rate swap 
contract. The challenge then is to allow competition between well-organized and 
secure clearinghouses without losing the benefits of netting and collateral pooling. 
                                                 
38 In September 2006, Amaranth lost $6 bn out of the $9 bn it was managing. By contrast, the direct losses from 
Lehman's failure were relatively modest (net payouts on its CDS contracts amounted to $5 bn); but that failure 
had a major macroeconomic impact and completely changed the IMF global growth prospects (Haldane 2009).  
Cecchetti (2007) compares the failure of Amaranth with that of LTCM (1998), whose interest rate swaps were 
not traded on an exchange. 
39 There is no reason to prevent non-regulated entities from trading in non-standard products or for that matter in 
non-transparent markets. 
40 Under cross-margining, a market participant can take excess collateral/margin on one account to meet the 
collateral requirement on another account. 
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5.2  Regulatory reforms 
 
          The recent explosive growth of OTC derivative markets has added much opacity and 
can be viewed as a form of regulatory evasion, in which cross-exposures were underpriced in 
terms of capital requirements. "Too interconnected to fail" unregulated institutions were 
rescued at the expense of the taxpayer; although this was not the first time,41 the magnitude of 
the recent bailouts of unregulated institutions is alarming. Such institutions were able to have 
their cake and eat it too. They were unregulated and at the same time could avail themselves 
of an access to a safety net built on taxpayer money, which allowed them to borrow from 
other parties without being carefully monitored by the latter. Relatedly, and importantly, both 
markets and regulators have little information about the consequences of pulling the plug on 
an institution. The bankruptcy of Lehman is widely believed to have had major consequences 
on the functioning of the markets worldwide. Opacity thus has a major cost for markets and 
not only for taxpayers. 
 
          Is the solution to enlarge the scope of regulation? Some oversight will be imposed on 
hedge funds, or more generally “Tier 1 institutions” that are deemed to expose the financial 
system to systemic risk. This however is likely to prove very insufficient for two reasons. 
First, regulators are understaffed and have a hard time overseeing institutions (retail banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds) with small depositors. Extending the scope of regulation 
will require a substantial upward adjustment in their budget. Second, and before you know it, 
Pacific Gas and Electric, General Electric and Boeing will become hedge funds if the existing 
hedge funds and other institutions in the Tier 1 group are subject to a strict regulation. The 
lack of clear critera for defining Tier 1 institutions and the potential migration of risk taking 
could imply that the entire private sector would need to be subject to regulatory reporting. 
 
          In my view, a better approach is to return to the standard rationale for micro-prudential 
regulation and to delineate a regulated sphere (retail banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds, broker-dealers) in which the regulators defend the interests of unsophisticated 
investors. Interaction between this regulated sphere and the rest of the economy should take 
place in standardized products and on approved clearinghouses, or else should be subject to 
substantial capital charges42. There is of course a cost to this solution, as OTC markets allow 
contracts to be finely tailored to individual circumstances. However, it has become clear that 
contracts in OTC markets often have been motivated more by the prospect of fees and by 
underpriced capital requirements than by first-order hedging benefits. Innovation in financial 
markets could in part migrate to the development of standardized products beyond the 
existing ones, so that most of the participants could cover their major risks. The loss in terms 
of market completeness then seems dwarfed by the misbehavior and huge bailouts that 
resulted from OTC markets. 
 
 
5.3  Economics of contagion 
 
                                                 
41 Recall the rescue of the LTCM hedge fund in 1998, The Fed then coordinated an injection by the creditors of 
LTCM. The fund was liquidated in 2000. 
42 This view is gaining traction (Basel III will create incentives to move contracts to platforms will central 
clearing counterparty), although it is still unclear whether the higher capital charges that will apply to customized 
contracts will reflect the price of risk. 
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          A large literature (e.g. Allen-Gale 2000a, Kiyotaki-Moore 1997) describes how a small 
shock to one institution or to the economy may propagate in a financial system with given 
cross-exposures. For example, domino effects are shown to be related to the completeness of 
the structure of claims (Allen-Gale). This literature also illustrates the opaqueness associated 
with bilateral exposures. As Caballero and Simsek (2009) note, in order to know the health of 
its counterparties, a participant in financial markets must also know the health of its 
counterparties’ counterparties, and so on. Becoming well informed about the solvency of the 
entire financial system is daunting for participants regulators43. Caballero and Simsek show 
how deteriorating conditions may make information processing unmaneageable to banks and 
result in a panic (a generalized withdrawal/flight to quality equilibrium). 
 
          While this literature obtains a number of useful insights, my view is that one should still  
build on it in order to derive policy implications. A “Lucas critique” of this literature is that 
one cannot assume that the network of cross exposures is unaffected by the regulatory 
environment or by the underlying risk structure. Different environments will give rise to 
different mutual exposures and contagion possibilities. Recall our discussion of intraday 
payment systems. There, the possibility of domino effects has been taken on board for 
decades, and centralized systems with very visible and limited cross exposures have been put 
in place. Put differently, the parties (institutions, regulators) are cogniscent of the possibility 
of domino effects and have accordingly  limited cross exposures and made them transparent. 
Conversely, the private sector has quickly identified regulatory loopholes in the treatment of 
OTC markets and has reacted accordingly by developing bilateral exposures. 
          Relatedly, one must ask what bilateral exposures are all about. There are two potential 
rationales with rather distinct normative implications: regulatory evasion, as discussed above, 
and mutual monitoring. By “mutual monitoring” I have in mind mutual monitoring of the 
quality of assets or the solvency of institutions more than investments in learning the bilateral 
exposures of various participants in the financial systems (such investments are socially 
wasteful, as the exposures could be cheaply read from positions in centralized exchanges, if 
the latter exist). Ignoring regulatory evasion, bilateral exposures can be motivated only by the 
existence and the use of decentralized information not held by a central agent (say a central 
bank or a regulator). As we noted above, one can wonder about the decentralized nature of 
government guaranteed interbank loans, when the latter reflect no decentralized information 
due to the guarantee. In the absence of government guarantee or of a prospect of government 
bailout, a bilateral exposure should really be about saying: “I have information that makes me 
trust you, and so I’m willing to accept the corresponding counterparty risk”. As argued in 
Rochet-Tirole (1996a), this monitoring view has implications for capital adequacy rules (or 
margining rules in exchanges). Finally, it bears emphasizing that, as some payment systems 
illustrate, the use of decentralized information is not inconsistent with a centralized approach.         
  
 
 6.  Aggregate liquidity 
 
6.1 Is there sufficient inside liquidity?  
 
 Let us start with a basic question, that of the sufficiency of inside liquidity at the 
aggregate level. We have seen that in the presence of agency costs, the (Arrow-Debreu and 
Modigliani-Miller) feasibility of "financing as you go" by resorting to the capital market does 
                                                 
43 Furthermore, from the Dang-Gorton-Holmström analysis mentionned earlier, we know that participants’ 
information acquisition will in general respond to market circumstances. 
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not hold at the individual firm level; because investors cannot grab the entire benefits 
associated with their investment, they tend to ration the financing they extend to the firm. 
However, "financing as you go" might hold "on average" at the macroeconomic level, and so 
the corporate sector might not need outside stores of value to finance desirable re-
investments. We therefore investigate the sufficiency of inside liquidity in the example 
described in Section 3.1 and specialized to p = r = 0; the conclusions however are very 
general.44 
 
 Recall that the representative entrepreneur invests i at date 0 and thus borrows i – a; 
he also spends qxi to invest xi in liquid assets, each of which yields 1 unit at date 2. With 
probability α, the entrepreneur does not need to reinvest at date 1. With probability 1- α, he 
must reinvest one unit per unit of investment to be brought to completion at date 2. Feasible 
continuation scales j ≤ i are given by condition (1'):  
where R > ρ0 is the rate of interest between dates 1 and 2. 
 
 As we noted in Section 3.1, "finance as you go" (x = 0) is not sustainable if the 
entrepreneur wants to withstand the shock: in case of a shock, diluting date-0 investors yields 
at most 0 j  while date-1 investors demand a return  0 .Rj j  So no reinvestment is doable. 
 
6.1.1 No aggregate shock  
Let us first assume that there is a continuum of ex ante identical entrepreneurs and that 
at date 1, a fraction (1- α) of these face a liquidity shock. We make the following claim:45 
 
Even in the absence of other stores of value, liquidity is cheap (q = 1). The private sector 
produces enough inside liquidity to efficiently withstand liquidity shocks that it should 
withstand; another way of rephrasing the same point is that if one introduces a store of value 
(a Treasury bond, say) delivering 1 at date 2, this store of value will trade at price 1 at date 
0: it won't embody any liquidity premium for supplying liquidity services, or equivalently, its 
interest rate will be equal to the economy wide rate (here 0); there is no risk-free rate puzzle. 
 
Suppose that indeed q=1, that is, that liquidity is priced by the consumers' marginal 
rate of substitution; we will later need to check that the securities issued by the private sector 
provide enough liquidity so as to induce no shortage of it. There are many ways for 
entrepreneurs to plan and hoard liquidity. A "reasonable" one may go as follows: the 
entrepreneur contracts with a financial institution for a line of credit equal to i. The financial 
institution must then hoard (1- α) Ri on average to be able to meet its obligations. If this line 
is drawn, the financial institution becomes the senior creditor and obtains 0i  at date 2. The 
financial institution in exchange demands at date 0 a commitment fee equal to 
0(1 )( )f R i    ; it makes money (f) if the credit line is not drawn, and loses money 
0(( ) )R i f  if the entrepreneur faces an overrun. This is indeed the nature of a credit line: 
there would be no reason to contract in advance on a credit line if at date 1 the financial 
institution were always happy to provide the funds; it is precisely because lending is a 
                                                 
44 See Holmström-Tirole (1998 and 2009).  
45 The key assumption for this proposition to hold is that the corporate sector be a net borrower. Woodford 
(1990) analyzed the case of a corporate sector that is a net lender; there is then always a shortage of inside 
liquidity, even in the absence of macroeconomic shock. 
0                                   (1')j xij
R
 
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money-losing operation at date 1 that it must be pre-arranged.  
 
The other investors must bring in i – a (the investment cost minus the entrepreneur's 
contribution to it) plus the commitment fee, so i a f   in total. They are willing to do so, as 
they get back 0i  with probability α  and:  
 
0 0(1 )( )i a R i i        (which is nothing but (4) with q = 1). 
 
This example is straightforwardly reinterpreted in terms of a choice of maturity 
structure. Keep the same numbers, except that the investment cost for a project of size i is 
now ( 1)ci c   instead of i and that the investment returns a safe short-run profit equal to ri, 
where c-Rr =1 at date 1. A per unit of investment short-term debt d = r forces the firm to 
disgorge the short-term profit and makes up for the increased investment cost from the point 
of view of investors. Alternatively, the entrepreneur can now do without a credit line, but 
secure liquidity through a longer maturity structure, in which the short-term per unit debt is 
only 0( ),d r R     provided that the firm can commit not to misinvest its liquidity when it 
does not need it46.  
This is all well and good, but we haven't addressed the "macroeconomic question'': 
where will the financial institution find the 0( )R i  that it has committed to bring in if the 
credit line is drawn? Given that the firm-idiosyncratic events of liquidity shocks are 
independent and so there is no macroeconomic uncertainty, exactly a fraction 1  of the 
entrepreneurs face an overrun. 
 
Let the financial institution cover the investment shortfall i–a and invest the 
0(1 )( )R i    it receives in commitment fees in ordinary claims on other entrepreneurs. If a 
financial institution is diversified, the per-firm value of the resulting portfolio is 0i  at date 
1. To honor its credit line commitments, the financial institution needs 
0 0(1 )( ) ( )R i i i a       , so everything is in order if firms are net borrowers ( )i a . 
Note that this arrangement requires some prudential supervision: the financial institution in 
general would make more profit by selecting subsets of entrepreneurs for which liquidity 
shocks are correlated as this strategy guarantees a large profit when such shocks do not arise, 
and otherwise does not expose the financial institution, which is protected by limited 
liability.47 
 
To sum up, in the absence of macroeconomic shock, the corporate sector as a whole in 
principle produces enough inside liquidity to meet the liquidity shocks it wants to withstand, 
even though there is insufficient inside liquidity at the firm level. We have stressed that the 
adequacy of inside liquidity in the aggregate hinges on an efficient dispatching of available 
liquidity toward those firms in (moderate) need of cash. This can be accomplished for 
instance by pooling the available liquidity at the level of financial intermediaries, who then 
redispatch the liquidity through a mechanism akin to credit lines. 
 
6.1.2 Macroeconomic shock 
                                                 
46 See Holmström-Tirole (2011, Chapter 3) for an analysis of optimal contracting when the firm may re-invest 
unneeded liquidity into less profitable projects.  
47With perfect correlation of shocks in its portfolio, the financial institution makes 0i  per firm in the absence 
of overrun and 0 in case of overrun.  
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Matters are quite different in the presence of a macroeconomic shock. To take an 
extreme case, suppose that with probability 1   all entrepreneurs face a cost overrun 
simultaneously; that is, the liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated48. Then there is no way 
investors are going to put in 1 per unit of investment and they cannot be forced to disgorge 
even if their portfolios of claims on the firms are seized. Somehow for the efficient allocation 
to be sustainable there must exist stores of values in quantity at least equal to 0( )R i  per 
firm. 
 
There is a shortage of inside liquidity when the economy is hit by an aggregate shock. 
Holding the “stock index'' (a portfolio of shares of the firms) does not bring any useful 
liquidity to firms or financial intermediaries: in the example above, the value of this stock 
index falls to 0 when the economy is hit by a shock: all firms are then valueless. The stock 
index has value in the absence of a shock, but this value serves no liquidity purpose as firms 
don't need liquidity in this circumstance. Put differently, the stock index does not allow firms 
to diversify as it does not create a store of value that can be resold in case of liquidity needs. 
Thus, the stock index is not a liquid security in the macroeconomic sense, even though it is 
perfectly liquid in the microeconomic sense.  
 
Let us now determine the liquidity yield discount and illustrate how boom-bust cycle 
may emerge in this framework. 
 
Suppose that there is a limited volume SL  of outside stores of value in the economy. 
Equation (5), taken with equality, establishes an upper bound maxq  on how much banking 
entrepreneurs are willing to pay for these stores of value. This upper bound increases with the 
probability 1   of a shock and with the pledgeability of returns 0  and decreases with R  
(recall that 0R  ).  
 
Let DL  denote the demand for liquidity whenever 
max1 < q q :  
 00
0
( )= ( ) = .                              (11)
1 ( )D
R aL R i
q R R
  
      
 
 Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium in the market for stores of value. 
 
                                                 
48 Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2009) look at the intermediate case in which there is aggregate risk, but 
firms are heterogeneous with respect to their exposure to this aggregate risk. They predict, and confirm 
empirically that firms with high aggregate risk have a higher ratio of cash reserves to lines of credit.  
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Figure 3: equilibrium in the market for liquidity 
 
 
6.1.3 Boom-bust episodes  
 
Suppose that the banks' equity a  increases at date 0. Then investment grows. If we 
keep the interest rate R  constant, the increase in bank equity, ceteris paribus, leads to an 
increase in investment, and therefore to an increase in liquidity demand (see equation (11)). 
Consequently, the price q  of liquid assets adjusts so as to clear the market for stores of value. 
For a large enough boom, the increase in equity leads to an actual increase in investment and 
a lower liquidity ratio = /Sx L i , which later creates a bust in bad times. 
 
6.2  Public supply of liquidity 
 
The state can provide (outside) liquidity by issuing Treasury securities and by using 
the future tax income to back up the reimbursements. In our stylized example for instance, the 
state can issue bonds at date 0 and promise to pay out at date 1.49 There are of course limits on 
what the state can do: first, the reimbursement through taxation introduces both substantial 
deadweight losses and credibility problems when national debt reaches high levels. Second, 
the taxation of consumers generates social costs when consumers have liquidity needs of their 
own. In particular, as employees of the firms, they may face hardships precisely when firms 
are in need of liquidity. 
 
The fundamental feature of public provision of liquidity is that the state should 
redistribute from consumers to corporations when the latter face pressing liquidity needs. So it 
does in practice, through a variety of instruments from open market operations to the discount 
window, from fiscal policies to non-indexed payroll taxes and deposit insurance premia. The 
recent events have illustrated this large-scale support: monetary bailout, banking 
recapitalizations, asset repurchases (as proposed, but not realized, by the Paulson and 
Geithner plans), relaxation of accounting standards (suspension of fair value accounting), 
underpriced state guarantees in interbank and other markets, and so forth. I am not necessarily 
approving of each and every countercyclical policy, but their general thrust is sound. 
 
Ideally, the state should be issuing  "state-contingent liquidity", i.e. liquidity that 
delivers cash only during recessions. Contingent claims of this kind are usually implicit rather 
                                                 
49Or date 2 for that matter. 
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than explicit; an exception is the sale by the Federal Reserve of contingent access to the 
discount window in the context of the potential Y2K computer bug; in this case, a well-
defined event of liquidity shortage (the potential problems with computers at the turn of the 
millennium) was identified and contingent claims accordingly issued by the central bank. But 
defining precisely a liquidity shortage in advance is rather hard and injections of liquidity 
remain for that reason by and large discretionary. 
 
The state has a comparative advantage in providing support in low-probability events. 
The private sector’s self provision of liquidity (the production of stores of value) takes place 
before the state of nature is revealed. If macroeconomic shortages of liquidity are rare, then 
private provision of liquidity is very costly. By contrast, the state can bring in funds ex post 
on a contingent basis. 
 
Another theoretical suggestion50 is that liquidity premia attached to risk-free rate assets 
are signals of the scarcity of aggregate liquidity at the various maturities and therefore are a 
useful guide for the issuing of government securities, both in level (total public debt) and in 
structure (choice of maturities); for example, a very low long rate signals substantial shortages 
of long-term stores of value, and therefore social gains to issuing long-term Treasury 
securities. A case in point is the issuing by HM Treasury of long-term bonds in reaction to the 
low rates triggered by the 2005 reform of pension fund requirements in the United Kingdom. 
 
The public provision of liquidity is motivated by a missing contract between 
consumers and the corporate sector (or more generally by missing contracts between entities 
that turn out to need cash and those who turn out to have sufficiently). A similar idea is 
exploited by Lorenzoni (2008), who analyzes fire sales. Suppose that the corporate sector 
invests in assets (say real estate), that it can sell to consumers in a macroeconomic downturn, 
when it needs cash. If it has to sell to consumers at a low price, it won’t be able to generate 
enough cash in bad states of nature. A Pareto improvement could be achieved in which 
consumers would “agree” to pay higher prices in recessions in exchange of some insurance 
premium paid in booms; put differently some asset price stabilization would be desirable.  
 
6.3  Asset overvaluation and fair value accounting 
 
          The overall shortage of stores of value sheds some interesting light on the role of asset 
bubbles on macroeconomic activity. In a standard rational bubble framework, bubbles 
compete with securities issued by corporations for the consumers’ savings and thereby crowd 
out productive investment (Tirole 1985) in the same way public debt also crowds out private 
investment (Peter A. Diamond 1965). This need no longer be the case if corporations need 
stores of value to adjust to the asynchronicity between cash availability and cash needs (Farhi-
Tirole 2009a). An asset bubble, by inflating the volume of stores of value, fuels growth. It is 
more likely to exist, the wider the gap between value and pledgeable income, that is the less 
developped financial markets are (one polar case is the neo-classical model, with its perfect 
financial markets, i.e. the absence of gap between value and pledgeable income). When the 
bubble crashes, the economy contracts51.  
 
                                                 
50 See Holmström-Tirole (2001). 
51 Another worthy point is that bubbles are consistent with dynamic efficiency in the presence of non-pledgeable 
income. For independent work on the impact of asset bubbles on economic activity, see Narayana Kocherlakota 
(2009). Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) develop a monetary economy framework in which the issuance of money to 
satisfy the economic agents’ demand for easy-to-resell stores of value improves welfare. 
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          This analysis shows that bubbles, if they boost investment by increasing corporate 
access to stores of value, still are a very imperfect form of liquidity for two reasons. The first 
is obvious: bubbles may burst, so their owner cannot fully count on realizing their full value. 
Second, and more interestingly, bubbles burst “at the wrong time”. The burst of the bubble 
creates a recession and lowers interest rates. Conversely, an otherwise generated recession 
makes it more difficult to sustain a bubble. Overall, the picture is one of a negative correlation 
between asset values and liquidity demand. So it is precisely when the corporate sector wants 
the money most that it is not available. Consequently, bubbles trade at a (liquidity) discount 
relative to the value embodying only the probability that the bubble burst. 
 
          This discussion is related to the current debates on asset price stability mandates, on the 
one hand, and on fair value accounting, on the other hand. The dominant view, associated 
with Greenspan and Bernanke in particular, has been that even if one could recognize an asset 
price bubble, monetary policy should not react to it unless there is a concern for inflation 
(e.g., Ben S. Bernanke 2002, Bernanke and Mark Gertler 2000, 2001). This view has been 
called into question in the wake of the recent crisis, in which an asset price bubble combined 
with fair value accounting boosted the institutions’ solvency and encouraged investment (fair 
value accounting has been perceived to be an amplifying mechanism in the downturn as well, 
forcing institutions to resell assets in reaction to reduced solvency, triggering further asset 
price decreases and thereby further sales).  
 
          It is hard to rejoice over the recent tinkering with reclassification, a relaxation of fair 
value accounting, even if one understands its motivation. Fair value accounting, despite its 
drawbacks, has clear benefits. In case of losses (“ex post”), it forces a bank to recognize these 
losses and to engage in deleveraging. “Ex ante”, the prospect of having to downsize if assets 
lose some of their value reduces the attractiveness of bad investments. In a nutshell, fair value 
accounting is an important disciplining device. 
 
          But, for all its merits, fair value accounting requires some adjustments in our regulatory 
context. To see this, let’s return to asset bubbles. We saw that bubbles are a very imperfect 
store of value because they may burst and furthermore they tend to burst at the wrong time. 
This “double whammy” makes a case for not using market value accounting, as the 
corresponding assets hardly serve as a cushion.  
 
          This discussion is also linked to the debate on countercyclical capital adequacy 
requirements. Until recently, it was admitted in regulatory circles that capital requirements 
should not vary with the cycle; the fear has always been that regulators would face intense 
lobbying by the industry if they had discretion to adjust the Cooke ratio or any other 
regulatory rule. If anything, capital requirements lately have been procyclical with the advent 
of fair value accounting. Yet economic theory provides arguments in favor of countercyclical 
capital adequacy requirements, that would increase during booms in order to constitute a 
stronger cushion for bad times52. 
 
          One rationale for countercyclical capital adequacy requirements (CARs) is the loanable 
funds effect. It stems from the fact that regulated institutions are central to the provision of 
credit to the real sector, and in particular to small and medium size enterprises. In a banking 
boom, such as the one experienced before the subprime crisis, the higher availability of loans 
to the real sector driven by the high level of bank capital lowers the banks’ markup on 
                                                 
52 A variant of this countercyclical rule is dynamic provisioning, which was used by Spain before the subprime 
crisis. 
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inframarginal loans and induces a shift toward marginal and less profitable loans. These shifts 
call for a bigger cushion, i.e. a higher equity over assets ratio. Conversely, adverse 
macroeconomic shocks deplete banks’ capital position and, under invariant CARs,  impose 
deleveraging upon them. As a consequence the spread between interest rates faced by 
consumers and those demanded by banks increases. While this “capital scarcity rent” allows 
banks to slowly reconstitute their capital, the shortage of loanable funds also creates a credit 
crunch, which hits the financially most fragile firms, often the smaller ones (Holmström-
Tirole 1997). Adjusting the CAR to the overall capital condition of the banking sector 
stabilizes interest rates and access to credit. 
 
          Another potential rationale for contercyclical CAR is the insurance effect (Dewatripont 
and Tirole 1994). It is related to the fact that the Basel rules make no distinction between 
idiosynchratic shocks, for which the bank’s management should be held partly accountable, 
and macroeconomic shocks, for which the bank bears no responsibility. Based on a well-
known principle (due to Holmström 1979) according to which economic agents should be 
held accountable only for outcomes over which they have control,  it can therefore be argued 
that the Basel rules are excessively tough on (lenient with) banks in recessions (booms). This 
suggests some automatic recapitalization process in banking recessions and some tax on 
banking leverage during booms (the combination of the two amounting to an insurance 
scheme provided by the government). 
 
 
7.  A call for macro-prudential regulation 
 
As we noted earlier, an important recent trend has been the sharp increase in financial 
institutions' reliance on short-term, market liabilities. For example: 
 
 Commercial banks have pledged substantial liquidity support to the conduits. According to 
Acharya and Schnabl (2009), the 10 largest conduit administrators (mainly commercial 
banks) had a ratio of asset backed commercial paper to equity ranging from 32.1% to 
336.6%. See Figure 4.  
 The increase in the market share of investment banks mechanically increases the financial 
sector's interest rate fragility, as investment banks rely on repo and commercial paper 
funding much more than commercial banks do. See Figure 5.  
 Primary dealers have increased their overnight to term borrowing ratio. See Figure 6.  
 LBOs have become more levered. See Figure 7.  
 
Overall, there has been a tremendous increase in the proportion of short-term liabilities 
in the financial sector. See Figure 8. Accordingly, there is a widespread feeling that maturity 
mismatches have played a prominent role in the crisis and that monetary policy and financial 
stability are closely linked (Adrian-Shin 2008). 
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Figure 4 
Source: Chapter 2 in Acharya-Richardson (2009). 
 
 
   
 
Source: flow of funds (percentage of total assets) 
Figure 5 
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Source: Haver Analytics 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
Leverage Ratio for LBOs (1999-2007) 
This figure graphs the average total debt leverage ratio for LBOs in both the U.S. and Europe with EBITDA of 
50 million or more in dollars or Euros, respectively. The chart covers the period from 1999 to 2007. 
Source: Standard & Poor's LCD. 
Figure 7 
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Source: Adrian-Shin (2009) 
Figure 8 
 
 
 The recent crisis unveiled the dire consequences of a widespread maturity mismatch. 
This section, based on the analysis in Farhi-Tirole (2009b), argues that there is a two-way 
relationship between maturity mismatches and the massive bailout that we have witnessed. 
 
The public bailout of the financial sector has taken many forms, but can be roughly 
decomposed into a monetary bailout and a fiscal one. The former consists in keeping 
extremely low short-term rates so as to allow institutions that have chosen to depend on the 
wholesale market not to go under. The latter takes the form of recapitalizations, liquidity 
support and asset repurchases.  
 
          Let us start with monetary bailouts.  Although there are obviously relevant nominal 
features of monetary policy (most prominently, the risk of inflation), we capture a key aspect 
of this policy while assuming away the price stability issue and positing that liquidity 
corresponds to claims on real resources. It reduces borrowers' cost of short-term liabilities. 
This impact amounts in the model to a reduction in the date-1 interest rate R. The benefit of a 
loose monetary policy is, as we have seen, that it rescues institutions that rely on the 
wholesale market for their funding. The costs associated with keeping interest rates low are 
several:53 First, low interest rates establish a wedge between marginal rate of substitution and 
marginal rate of transformation.54 
  
 Second, they induce an implicit subsidy from consumers to the corporate sector (hence 
the use of the term "bailout", which in common language takes the more neutral form of 
"support to the banking system" or of "transmission mechanism"); the lower yield on savings 
transfers resources from consumers to borrowers, but unlike a direct recapitalization the 
money does not transit through the state. Suppose, in the model of Section 3, that the natural 
                                                 
53 See Farhi-Tirole (2009b) for more detail. 
54 One may object that monetary policy impacts the short-term rates and so the divergence between MRS  and 
MRT is a second-order effect. However, monetary policy kept the rates extremely low between 2001 and 2004, 
and has been setting negative real rates since 2007 and will keep doing so for a while.  
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rate of interest is equal to 1 (consumers have preferences 2 0 ct t ). Then the implicit subsidy 
is equal to 0(1 )i  as the investors must bring in some manner i in case of a shock and get 
back only 0i . Although it does not flow through the Treasury’s accounts and is usually 
perceived as a countercyclical policy rather than as a transfer, this subsidy is real and has 
definitely contributed to the large profits made by some banks in the aftermath of the crisis. 
 
 Third, they sow the seeds for the next crisis: low short-term interest rates boost 
investment by lowering the overall cost of capital; they also encourage institutions to borrow 
short and thereby to adopt an illiquid balance sheet. This effect too is captured by the basic 
model: a decrease in R increases investment by reducing the cost of capital (equation (3)).55 
Adrian and Shin (2008) document the relationship between low interest rates and maturity 
mismatches in the case of investment banks. This third cost also fits with the idea of a “risk-
taking channel” in the transmission mechanism, i.e., of an impact of changes in policy rates 
on risk perception and risk tolerance (Borio-Zhu 2008).  
 
 Fourth, a loose monetary policy creates inflation and distorts money demand, and, in 
New-Keynesian models, induces price dispersion.  
 
          The key observation is that, except for the (more or less proportional) implicit subsidy 
component, the costs of a loose monetary policy are economy-wide; they resemble a “fixed 
cost”. Consequently, the central bank is willing to incur these costs if there are enough 
(strategic) fragile players. Put differently, the policy response makes balance-sheet risk 
choices strategic complements. The more other institutions (especially ones that a central 
bank will be eager to rescue, such as large banks ot too-interconnected-to-fail institutions) 
gamble on the yield curve and adopt an illiquid balance sheet, the more an individual bank is 
expecting to face a low interest rate and thus favorable refinancing conditions, and so the 
more it benefits from sacrificing capital insurance for scale. 
 
          To sum up, when everyone engages in maturity transformation, authorities haver little 
choice but facilitating refinancing, and so refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the 
return on equity. This simple observation has several corollaries: 
 There may be multiple equilibria. 
 In contrast with CAPM, which predicts that banks, if endowed with the freedom to 
select the states of nature in which they face financial difficulties, will choose 
positions that, whenever feasible, makes them negatively correlated with the market 
portfolio, it is in the interest of each bank to be illiquid in the same states of nature as 
other banks. The prediction is then one of a joint concentration on the same high tail 
                                                 
55 This framework does not capture the manipulation of the rate of interest between dates 0 and 1. If 0R  denotes 
this rate and R (as before) the interest rate between dates 1 and 2, it can be shown that the entrepreneur will 
choose to hoard enough liquidity to withstand a crisis ( )0x R    if  
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and no liquidity (x = 0) otherwise. It is easy to see that the right-hand side of this equation is increasing in ,0R  
so that a lower date-0 interest rate 0R discourages liquidity hoarding and increases the maturity mismatch 
problem. 
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risk and of an endogenous macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 While corporate finance theory predicts that an increase in the probability of needing 
cash increases the demand for capital insurance (i.e, more hoarding of liquidity), the 
endogenization of the policy response shows that an increase in the probability of 
distress may reduce the incentive to hoard liquidity. The reason for this surprising 
result is that the increase in the probability of distress may imply that more institutions 
are indeed in distress, forcing the central bank to implement a loose monetary policy. 
 The central bank faces a time-inconsistency problem. It would want to commit to a 
tough monetary policy, but when push comes to shove and if enough key institutions 
choose to rely on wholesale markets, it will lower interest rates. 
 This offers a rationale for macro-prudential regulation, i.e., regulation that does not 
just look at the liquidity and solvency positions of individual banks, but also looks at 
the overall maturity mismatch56. 
 The analysis suggests imposing a minimum liquidity requirement, at least for those 
actors that authorities will be keen to rescue. By contrast, subsidizing liquidity often 
reduces welfare: institutions’ cost of financing then decreases, inducing them to 
increase their leverage, making ex-post bailouts even more necessary. 
 When banks are subject to a minimum liquidity requirement, they may choose to 
substitute cheaper, but potentially toxic assets for more expensive and safer stores of 
value. Furthermore, the choices of liquid asset quality often exhibit strategic 
complementarities as well. Thus the regulator should also monitor the quality and not 
only the quantity of liquid assets.  
 
 Monetary bailouts are an important, but not the unique component of rescue packages. 
Typically, authorities also engage in loan guarantees, asset repurchases and recapitalizations. 
One may wonder whether monetary policy should be part of a rescue package, since its 
effects are diffuse and targeted rescues would seem to be a more appropriate response to 
banking problems. The paper applies mechanism design to obtain the optimal rescue package. 
The first conclusion is that monetary policy, because it benefits those institutions that really 
need cash, is always part of a rescue package, despite the fact that it is less targeted than direct 
recapitalizations. Actually, it is the only form of bailout over a range of parameters. In 
general, though, monetary policy is complemented by a recapitalization, perhaps involving a 
deleveraging request in order to screen out banks that would want to benefit from subsidized 
public support, but don’t really need the money.  The bottom line is that monetary and fiscal 
bailouts, if different in their working and effects, work toward the common objective of 
restoring the institutions' liquidity and solvency positions and cannot be conceived separately. 
 
8. Concluding notes 
 
           Liquidity mismatches and the over-reliance on wholesale funding were at the core of 
failures and rescues in the recent crisis. Despite much progress in our understanding of what 
drives liquidity shortages at the individual and aggregate levels, academic knowledge still has 
some way to go in order to provide satisfactory inputs into the design of regulatory and 
monetary policies. Achieving this will require further convergence between micro-and macro-
economics. Microeconomists interested in financial regulation and markets can no longer 
ignore macroeconomic factors leading to the simultaneous freeze in markets that are central to 
the institutions’ market and funding liquidity; they must develop better models of systemic 
                                                 
56 For premonitory work on the need to engage on macro-prudential oversight, see Borio (2003) and Borio-Shim 
(2007).  
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risk; and they can no longer look at institutions in isolation and not consider the overall 
maturity mismatch and the allocation of financial muscle.  
 
           Conversely, macroeconomists need to account for arcane details of prudential 
regulation, corporate finance and market microstructure if they are to develop a better 
understanding of countercyclical monetary policies and the transmission mechanism; Keynes’ 
and Hicks’ emphasis on liquidity called for an integrated view of micro and macro treatments 
of the financial system. I hope that the crisis will encourage the pursuit of the corresponding 
research agenda and accelerate the convergence between the two fields. 
 
            Listing the many other open questions exhaustively lies outside the scope of this 
paper. As we have noted, though, extending the theory to account for the nominal dimension 
of liquidity stands high on the research agenda. So does the analysis of the multi-country 
version of the model, as international bailouts of the financial system raise serious questions 
in a world still dominated by home-based regulations and deposit insurance schemes. Finally, 
while three-period models (the most common in the literature) tractably capture many 
relevant insights, infinite-horizon versions are required for the analysis of important topics, 
such as the linkage between bailouts and dynamic public finance, or (as we already noted) the 
evolution of liquidity ratios over time.  
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